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UCC § 2-615: SHARP INFLATIONARY INCREASES IN COST
AS EXCUSE FROM PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT
I. Introduction
At a time when the wholesale price index is increasing at the rate of nearly
20 percent per year' and some individual commodity price indexes are increasing
at an even faster rate,2 sellers who have negotiated fixed price, long-term con-
tracts may find performance at the agreed price increasingly impracticable,
perhaps in some cases, to the point of financial disaster. Consider the plight of
the supplier whose costs of production depend heavily upon the costs of coal,
petroleum products, metal products, lumber, farm products, or any other com-
modity in short supply. Suppose either that he is locked into a major five-, ten-,
or twenty-year contract in which he agreed to supply goods at a fixed price or
that the contract contains a price escalator clause which proves to be completely
inadequate to reflect the seller's actual cost increase.3 Consider a seller whose
costs relative to price may be expected to rise 50, 100, or 200 percent over the
course of a long-term contract.' With a 25 or 50 percent projected markup,
performance of the contract over a course of years would cause substantial losses,
perhaps even financial ruin. The buyer, on the other hand, may have an ex-
tremely lucrative contract when the general market for the seller's goods rises
to reflect the true costs of producing those goods.
With increasing frequency, it may become necessary to consider whether
sharp inflationary increases in cost can be sufficient to excuse a seller from
1 Between July, 1973, and July, 1974, the wholesale price index advanced 20 percent.Between August, 1973, and August, 1974, it advanced 18 percent. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUSINESS STATISTICS 3 (September 27, 1974).
2 The following are some of the more extreme increases in the individual commodity
indexes between 1972 and June, 1974: petroleum products, 113 percent; coal, 66 percent;
inedible fats and oils, 212 percent; nonferrous metals, 72 percent; farm products, 34 percent;
grain, 118 percent; lumber, 38 percent; iron and steel, 38 percent. U.S. DEP'T OF COaMEaCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S-9 '(July, 1974).
3 The price escalator clause may have projected an arbitrary 2 or 3 percent price increase
per year; or it may have been based upon the wrong type of price indexes; or it may fail to
reflect particular circumstances of the individual seller, for example, a shutdown of one of
his major sources of supply which forces him to purchase his raw materials at exorbitant prices
in a market where most of the available supply has already been claimed.
4 The following table illustrates the way in which a continuing high rate of inflation can
cause substantial increases in cost over the course of a long-term contract.
Price increase/year Total increase after X years
Cost (Price escalation relative to price increase
increase/year clause) 2 yrs. 5 yrs. 10 yrs.
10% .... 21% 61% 160%
20% .... 44% 150% 520%
50% .... 125% 660% 5700%
10% 3% 14% 39% 94%
20% 3% 36% 116% 360%
20% 10% 19% 55% 138%
50% 10% 85% 370% 2000%
Thus, with a 20 percent per year increase in cost and a 10 percent per year increase in price,
costs would increase 150 percent (2.5 times) over the course of five years and price would
increase 61 percent (1.61 times). In terms of percentage increases, the seller would be in the
same position as if price had been fixed and costs had increased 55 percent.
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performance at the agreed price.' Under the Uniform Commercial Code §
2-615, a seller, "unless he has assumed a greater obligation," is excused from his
contractual obligations if performance "has been made impracticable by the oc-
currence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made."6 Three issues are involved: (1) Under what
circumstances does a seller assume a "greater obligation" to bear the risks of
inflationary cost increases? (2) When are increases in cost sufficient to make per-
formance "impracticable"? (3) Is an inflationary increase in cost "a contingency
the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made"?7
II. A Greater Obligation of Risk
In the absence of any agreement by which the seller expressly assumes a
"greater obligation" to bear the risks of increases in the cost of his performance,
he may still in two respects impliedly assume a greater obligation. First, he will
assume a "greater obligation" than the buyer to bear the ordinary risks inherent
in his promise. Second, he may assume an even "greater obligation" than this
ordinary assumption of risk because of the circumstances in which the contract
was made.
The first and more important respect in which the seller assumes a greater
obligation of risk follows from a principle which goes to the very heart of con-
tract law: the promisor assumes the risks of his promise. As Justice Holmes stated
in Day v. United States:' "One who makes a contract never can be absolutely
certain that he will be able to perform it when the time comes, and the very
5 One of the first decisions to consider the possibility of excuse because of a sharp in-
flationary increase in cost was handed down just recently by a lower New York court. In
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
a dairy sought excuse from its obligation to deliver milk to the Elmira school district when
its costs increased 23 percent from June to December, 1973.
6 The entire text of UNIFORM COMMER cIAL CODE § 2-615 reads as follows:
Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to
the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good
faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
'(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the
seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries
among his customers but may at his option include regular customers not
then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manu-
facture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or
non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the
estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
7 See Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966), where the court analyzed § 2-615 in terms of these same three issues. But see note 77,
infra.
8 245 U.S. 159 (1917).
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essence of it is that he takes the risk within the limits of his undertaking.",, The
very purpose of a contract is to bind the respective parties to fulfil their promises
and to assume the risks inherent in that fulfillment. Justice Traynor noted in
Lloyd v. Murphy0 that "the purpose of a contract is to place the risks of per-
fornance upon the promisor.""'  Or, as the court also stated in McCulloch v.
Liguori:2 "[A] person contracting with eyes open and aware of the facts is
presumed to undertake performance at the risk of interference from agencies not
expressly provided against."'"
The doctrine of excuse, then, stands as an exception to basic principles of
contract law; in fact, it was not recognized at all by the early common law."4
Later decisions, unwilling to enforce contractual obligations which became
onerous under changed circumstances but also unwilling to "excuse" perform-
ance, granted relief by imputing an "implied condition" to performance. 5 Thus,
an obligation to pay exorbitant rents for the use of a flat was .excused for
failure of an "implied condition" that the coronation procession of King Edward
VII be held in view of the apartment.' So also, a contractual obligation to lease
a music hall was construed as contingent upon the implied condition that the
hall not be destroyed by fire.' 7
More thoughtful opinions recognized that this "implied condition" was
simply a judicial construction designed to reach a just result without undermining
basic contract theory.' Others treated the implied condition as something pro-
ceeding from the actual intention of the parties.' Given that the parties did not
make an express agreement allocating the risks of unforeseen contingencies, what
would have been their reasonable expectations had they considered them?2" Un-
fortunately, this implied condition theory was often based upon a complete fic-
tion,2 whether recognized or not; the parties actually may have had completely
different expectations as to who should bear extraordinary risks.22
The Uniform Commercial Code, more interested in furthering "commercial
standards," "equitable principles," and "good faith"2 than in safeguarding legal
fictions, makes excuse available in situations where "performance has become
commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening circumstances
9 Id. at 161.
10 25 CaI.2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
11 Id. at 54, 153 P.2d at 50.
12 88 Cal.App.2d 366, 199 P.2d 25 (1948).
13 Id. at 373, 199 P.2d at 30.
14 Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 22 (1962).
15 Id. at 21-24, 50-55.
16 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 '(C.A.).
17 Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
18 See Kinzer Constr. Co. v. State, 125 N.Y.S. 46, 54-55 (Ct. Cl. 1910), aff'd, 145 App.
Div. 41, 129 N.Y.S. 567 (1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 381, 97 N.E. 871 (1912); 6 WMLIsToN,
CONTRACTS § 1937 (rev. ed. 1938).
19 See, e.g., Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 392 Ill. 82, 64 N.E.2d 477 (1945),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 804 (1946).
20 Cf. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47. 50 (1944).
21 See Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
22 See Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964] 2 Q.B. 226,
238-39 (C.A. 1963).)
23 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL Cooa § 2-615, Comment 6.
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not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting."'"
Although the Code language itself is broad and indefinite, § 2-615 does appear
to give some content to the "reasonable expectations" which may be imputed to
the parties. Rather than focusing upon some fictional mental conditions of the
parties, § 2-615 appears to attach primary importance to the more objective
criteria of practicability and foreseeability.
The second respect in which a seller may assume a "greater obligation" of
risk applies to those situations in which he would otherwise be excused because
unforeseen contingencies have made his performance impracticable, but where
he has expressly or impliedly assumed the obligation to bear extraordinary risks.26
In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States,26 for example, the court
construed Transatlantic's claim for excuse due to the sudden closing of the Suez
Canal in "stricter terms" because the "surrounding circumstances... [indicated]
a willingness by Transatlantic to assume abnormal risks."27 In United States v.
Wegematic Corp.,2" the court held that Wegematic, by its representations to the
government, had assumed the risk that it could engineer a "revolutionary break-
through" in the computer industry." Again, in Security Sewage Equipment v.
McFerren,° Security contracted to sell a sewage treatment plant to a real estate
developer and then sought excuse when the State Department of Health required
substantial modification of the plant; in holding that Security had assumed the
risk that its plans would not be approved by the Department of Health, the court
noted that "Security, by the nature of its business, possessed superior knowledge
of the requirements of the Department of Health."'3s
The negotiation discussions between the parties also might have some bear-
ing on the seller's assumption of risk. Where price agreement was reached only
after the laborious and careful negotiation of a complex price escalation provision,
it would appear that the seller would have a greater obligation to abide by that
price than where it was fixed by an almost casual reference to the prevailing
market price. The relative bargaining strengths of the two parties also might
serve to affect the seller's assumption of risk.12
The seller, then, may expressly assume a greater obligation to bear extraor-
dinary risks or he may impliedly assume such an obligation because of the
circumstances in which the contract was made. This assumption of risk, how-
ever, must be considered in close connection with the unforeseen supervening
24 Id., Comment 1. Some courts may continue to analyze excuse under the implied con-
dition theory even with the Code. See Low's Ezy-Fry Potato Co. v. J. A. Wood Co., 26 A.D.
583 (Dep't Agriculture 1967).
25 UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 8 states:
The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater liability
by agreement and such agreement is to be found not only in the expressed terms of
the contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage
and the like.
26 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
27 Id. at 319.
28 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
29 Id. at 676.
30 14 Ohio St.2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968).
31 Id. at 253, 237 N.E.2d at 900.
32 Cf. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944), where the court
stated that the "relation of the parties" is a factor to be considered in determining where
the burden of risk falls.
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circumstances which might make performance impracticable. On the one hand,
these supervening circumstances may be so extreme as to excuse performance
even where the seller has made a written agreement to the contrary.3 On the
other hand, the supervening circumstances may be insufficient to excuse a seller
who has assumed no extraordinary risks at all. Even absent the assumption of
a "greater obligation" by the seller, he will not be excused unless he can show
both that his performance is "impracticable" and that sharp inflationary cost
increases are "contingencies the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made.
' ' 4
III. Impracticability Due to Increased Cost
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the seller is excused when un-
foreseen contingencies make his performance "impracticable"; it is not necessary
that these contingencies make his performance "impossible" or that they serve
"to frustrate the venture." 5 The test is one of commercial impracticability and
the statutory provision is intended to further "the general policy of this Act to
use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good
faith."3
In line with the more liberal pre-Code cases,3" the Official Comment to §
2-615 indicates that performance may be made impracticable by sharp increases
in cost. s But "increased cost alone does not excuse performance" unless it is
sufficient to "alter the essential nature of the performance."' 9 The leading case of
Mineral Park Land Co. u. Howard0 illustrates the type of extreme impracticabil-
ity which almost certainly would be excused under § 2-615. The defendant con-
struction company in that case contracted to haul over 100,000 cubic yards of
gravel and earth from the plaintiff's land at specified rates. Although there was
enough gravel and earth on the plaintiff's land to meet the terms of the contract,
about 50,000 cubic yards were under the water level and could have been
removed only at an expense of 10 or 12 times the usual cost. The California
33 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615, Comment 8 states:
Generally, express agreements as to exemptions designed to enlarge upon or supplant
the provisions of this section are to be read in the light of mercantile sense and
reason, for this section itself sets up the commercial standard for normal and rea-
sonable interpretation and provides a minimum beyond which agreement may not go.
See HA.WEKLAND, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79
CoM. L. J. 75 '(1974).
34 UNIFORM COMMERCUL CoDa § 2-615.
35 Id., Comment 3.
36 Id., Comment 6.
37 See Annot., 84- A.L.R.2d 12, 60-62 (1962).
38 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4.
39 Id. Comment 4 reads as follows:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due
to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.
Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is
exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are
intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a
contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major
sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or alto-
gether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is
within the contemplation of this section.
40 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
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Supreme Court held that the defendant was excused for failing to remove the
50,000 cubic yards under water on the grounds of "impossibility": "A thing is
impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.""'
With less extreme cost increases, however, courts have been reluctant to
find excuse. In another leading case from California, Lloyd V. Murphy,
42
Justice Traynor held that the mere fact that unforeseen contingencies make
performance difficult, expensive, or even unprofitable does not excuse per-
formance." In Lloyd, the defendant leased an auto showroom for the purpose
of selling new cars. When the government ordered that the sale of new autos
be discontinued in 1942, the defendant invoked the doctrine of commercial
frustration and refused to pay the rent. The court upheld the lease: "Laws or
other governmental acts that make performance unprofitable or more difficult or
expensive do not excuse the duty to perform a contractual obligation."44 The
standard, said the court, was whether the unanticipated circumstance had made
performance "vitally different from what was reasonably to be expected."4 s
The Restatement of Contracts likewise took the liberal position that exces-
sive cost can be sufficient to excuse performance but, like the cases, extended
excuse only to situations of "impracticability because of extreme and unreason-
able difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved.1 4' This "extreme and unreason-
able" standard set forth by the Restatement has probably been the prevailing
and most commonly applied standard by which impracticability due to increased
cost has been measured."' More importantly, the few cases decided under §
2-615 have continued to apply this standard and have refused to find im-
practicability where the cost increase did not involve an "extreme and unreason-
able" or an "excessive and unreasonable" expense.4" The Code comment to §
2-615, however, uses language more moderate than "extreme and unreasonable";
it suggests that performance may become impracticable when an unforeseen
contingency causes a "marked increase" in cost. 9
What might an "extreme and unreasonable" or "marked increase" in cost
be? By way of illustration, the Restatement of Contracts gives tenfold and fifty-
fold increases in cost as examples of what is "extreme and unreasonable."5 0 The
Mineral Park case found an increase of 10 or 12 times unreasonable." In City of
41 Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460. Compare with the decision in Ballou v. Basic Constr. Co.,
407 F.2d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir. 1969), where the court held that performance could be excused
only if there was "objective impossibility."
42 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
43 Id. at 55, 153 P.2d at 51.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 54, 153 P.2d at 50. See also 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1963, at 5511 (rev.ed.
1938), where the same standard was suggested.
46 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932). It should be noted that when the Restate-
ment spoke of "extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, or injury,' it was not defining
"impracticability" but rather the older and more restrictive standard of "impossibility."
47 See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 61 (1962).
48 See American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Mar. Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942
(2d Cir. 1972); Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 456 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Northern
Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n., 518 P.2d 76, 81 (Alaska 1974); Portland Section of Council
of Jewish Women v. Sisters of Charity, 513 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Or. 1973).
49 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4.
50 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 460, Illustrations 2 and 3 '(1932).
51 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458.
[December 1974l
[Vol. 50:297]
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles," the court excused Los Angeles from performance
of a contract to dispose of Vernon's sewage for which Vernon was apparently
paying over $100,000 per year. Continued performance would have involved
construction of a $41 million sewage plant with yearly operating costs of
$500,000.5 The much more recent case of Northern Corp. u. Chugach Elec.
Ass'n 54 found a 93 percent cost increase impracticable.55 In that case the court
found that the parties had expressly contemplated that a contractor would haul
the rock for a dam reconstruction by truck across the frozen lake behind the dam.
When repeated unsuccessful efforts to truck the rock across the lake finally
resulted in loss of life, the court held that performance as contemplated was
"impossible" and that the contractor did not have to incur the nearly double
expenses of hauling the rock by barge.56
On the other hand, the courts of appeal in Transatlantic5 7 and American
Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd.55 held that 14 percent and 30
percent cost increases were not sufficient to constitute commercial impracticabil-
ity. In addition, both cited with approval the two leading English cases in which
the courts had refused to excuse performance and in which more extreme cost
increases were involved.5 9 Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. V. V/O Sovfracht (The
Eugenia)6" indicated that a cost increase of approximately 45 percent did not
constitute grounds for frustration.0 In Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl
G.m.b.H." 2 the House of Lords refused to excuse performance although costs
were doubled as a result of the Suez closing." In accord, Maple Farms v. City
School Dist.4 held on summary judgment that a 23 percent increase in the price
of milk between June and December of 1973 did not make performance im-
practicable. And in Portland Section of Council of Jewish Women u. Sisters of
Charity"5 the court held that it was not impracticable for a hospital to continue
to provide a ward bed for Jewish patients in return for a $5,000 payment made in
1927, even though the maintenance of a hospital bed was costing as much as
$140 per day:
We hold that the hazards of increasing expenses attributable to inflation and
new techniques were ones that should and could have been guarded against
52 45 Cal.2d 710, 290 P.2d 841 (1956).
53 Id. at 718-19, 290 P.2d at 846. It is not clear from the court's decision whether the
$41 million sewage plant would also serve the City of Los Angeles itself or whether it would
have to be built exclusively for the use of Vernon. In any case, the court stated that the dif-
ference between the cost and the contract price was "completely disproportionate." Id. at
720, 290 P.2d at 847.
54 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974).
55 Id. at 80 n.3.
56 Id. at 80-82.
57 363 F.2d at 319.
58 453 F.2d at 942. The court in American Trading also noted that the parties had
agreed upon a price 75 percent higher than the prevailing rate schedule. Id. at 941.
59 Id. at 942; 363 F.2d at 319 n.14.
60 f1964 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963).
61 Id. at 233.
62 119601 2 Q.B. 318, aff'd, [1962] A.C., 93 (1961).
63 Id. at 348.
64 76 flsc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
65 513 P.2d 1183 (Or. 1973).
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and that the hardship has not become so extreme as to have been beyond
any reasonable contemplation of the parties.66
And in a recent study of the problem by the Practicing Law Institute,67 Professor
James White concluded that even an unforeseen tenfold cost increase should not
excuse the seller: "Increase in price, even rather radical increase in price, is a
thing contracts are designed to protect against."68
Thus, on the basis of dictum in Transatlantic and American Trading, one
might say that a doubling in cost will be insufficient to trigger impracticability."9
On the other hand, the holding in Northern may indicate that a 90 percent cost
increase can make performance impracticable;"0 this holding, however, may be
limited to the particular facts of the case, where the parties had clearly con-
templated a manner of performance which became physically impossible. Given
the present state of the law, the attempt to establish percentage guidelines for
cost increases which will pinpoint the numerical boundaries of "impracticability"
could impute a precision which simply does not exist.7
When interpreted in light of such other broad and indefinite standards as
"equitable principles," "commercial standards," and "good faith,' 7 2 "imprac-
ticability" will be "an ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to
commercial practices and mores."'" In the absence of controlling precedent,
there is always room for a seller to argue that even a 50 percent or less increase
in cost was "unreasonable" or "marked" and that prevailing "commercial stan-
dards" in an unstable economy require excuse. But in view of the reluctance
with which courts have traditionally abrogated contractual obligations, it appears
unlikely that a 50 percent or even a 100 percent cost increase ordinarily would
constitute impracticability.
IV. The Foreseeability of Inflationary Increases in Cost
In order for a seller to be excused from the terms of a contract, it is not
sufficient that his performance be "impracticable"; in addition, performance
must be made impracticable "by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccur-
rence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made."7 4 A
seller may claim, of course, that he contracted under the "basic assumption"
that his costs would not increase, say, 50 percent and that he would never have
made the contract had he foreseen this contingency. Superficially, such an argu-
66 Id. at 1189. The court also attached great importance to the facts that the hospital's
gross yearly receipts were $12 million and that the hospital had traditionally provided the
bed as a charity to poor and needy persons.
67 WHITE, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Supervening Illegality, in BREACH OF
CONTRACT IN A SHORTAGE ECONOMY 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WHITE].
68 Id. at 19-20. In light of the cases discussed above, this view seems somewhat extreme;
nevertheless, it may be taken as illustrative of the proposition that the obligations of con-
tracts should not be lightly abrogated.
69 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
70 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
71 Moreover, much necessarily depends upon the circumstances of the individual parties.
The duration and the importance of the contract, the degree of loss which performance would
cause to the seller, the relative abilities of either party to absorb increasing prices all make
a given percentage increase more or less impracticable.
72 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6.
73 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
74 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615.
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ment may seem convincing, but it really says no more than that the seller made
the assumption that he was negotiating a profitable contract. This assumption is
implicit in all contracts including virtually all the bad deals ever made. A more
reasonable analysis of the "basic assumption" language would be to ask whether
the contingencies were "unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting."75 Again, "commercial
standards" and "good faith" must be used.
For a contingency to be foreseeable," it is not necessary that it be likely to
occur. For example, the court in Transatlantic, working with § 2-615, held that
the closing of the Suez Canal was foreseeable:
We know or may safely assume that the parties were aware, as were most
commercial men with interests affected by the Suez situation, see The
Eugenia supra, that the Canal might become a dangerous area. No doubt
the tension affected freight rates, and it is arguable that the risk of closure
became part of the dickered terms.77
In Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde,7 1 the court held that the
lessee of a trailer park should have foreseen "that cesspool systems do not last
forever and that when the septic system failed public sewer connections would be
required. 79 In West Los Angeles Institute v. Mayer,"0 the court held that an
adverse Internal Revenue Service ruling on a sale and leaseback arrangement
was foreseeable.
In Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrich Lumber Co.8 ' the court
held that it was foreseeable in January, 1941, that there would be a lack of
ships due to World War II. In Aristocrat Highway Display v. Stricklin,"2 the
court held it foreseeable in October 1941 that the United States would become
involved in World War II and that neon signs might be prohibited as a result.
So also, in Glen Falls Indemnity Co. u. Perscallo,"3 the court found that "[f]or
months before Pearl Harbor any American citizen should have been able to
foresee the imminence of war with the Axis Powers."
4 Lloyd v. Murphy,8 5
75 Id., Comment 1.
76 Like the cases, this note uses the terms "foreseen" and "foreseeable" interchangeably.
It should be recognized, however, that these terms may set somewhat different standards.
77 363 F.2d at 318. Although the court in Transatlantic devoted considerable attention
to the issue of foreseeability and clearly considered it a major factor in determining whether
performance should be excused, it considered the foreseeability issue not in connection with
the "basic assumption" language of the Code, as this Note does, but rather in connection
with the assumption of the risk issue previously discussed. Thus, although Transatlantic held
that the Suez closing was foreseeable, it also held that it was "something unexpected" and
therefore "a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made." Id. at 315-16. Since sellers never "expect" that their performance will
be impracticable, however, this approach would automatically make any impracticable con-
tingency also a "contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made"; hence this complex statutory language would be superfluous. As
long as the court believes that unforeseeability is necessary for excuse, it would appear logical
to consider it in connection with the "basic assumption!' language of the Code.
78 70 Cal.2d 666, 451 P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969).
79 Id. at 676, 451 P.2d at 727, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
80 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1966).
81 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1945).
82 68 Cal. App.2d 788, 157 P.2d 880 (1945).
83 96 Cal. App.2d 799, 216 P.2d 567 (1950).
84 Id. at 802, 216 P.2d at 570.
85 25 Cal.2d 48, 55-56, 153 P.2d 47, 51 (1944).
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discussed earlier, likewise held that contingencies resulting from World War II
were foreseeable.
In discussing the foreseeability issue in the study sponsored by the Practicing
Law Institute, Professor White suggests that it may be foreseeable in 1974 that
copper may be hard to buy because of political unrest in Peru and Chile, that
there may be an Arab oil embargo in 1984, or that a supplier as solvent as
Texaco may go bankrupt.8 6 The fact that the parties made no express provision
for the contingency does not necessarily mean that they contracted on the assump-
tion that it would not occur. As the court stated in Transatlantic: "Parties to a
contract are not always able to provide for all of the possibilities of which they
are aware, sometimes because they cannot agree, often simply because they are
too busy."
87
Although there have been virtually no litigated cases which have turned
upon the foreseeability of sharp inflationary increases in cost, by analogy with
the Suez and World War II cases, it would appear that the general 10 to 15
percent inflation of today was at least as foreseeable in the 1960's or even the
1950's as was the occurrence of the Suez closing and World War II.88 For
parties contracting in 1974 and 1975, what range of future inflation is foresee-
able? The monthly increases in the wholesale price index during July and August
1974 were both at an annual rate of well over 40 percent.8 " Is a 40 or 50 percent
general inflation "unforeseeable"? In light of the experience of some other
countries, is a 100 or 200 percent per year general inflation unforeseeable and
"not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting"?"0
Further, might not a major depression followed by deflation also be foreseeable?
Even where cost increases are so "marked" or "unreasonable" as to make
performance impracticable, in many industries, particularly those where short-
ages are greatest and cost increases most severe, these marked increases may have
been foreseeable when the contract was made. In such cases the Code, glossed by
the traditional weight of authority, does not support a claim for excuse and the
seller is obliged to perform his obligations, impracticable as this performance may
be. Since the seller is ordinarily presumed to assume the risks inherent in his
promise, the language of Lloyd v. Murphy"' would appear applicable to those
situations in which sharp cost increases were foreseeable: ". . [T]here should
have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision
gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed." 2
V. A Good Faith Obligation to Accept Price Adjustment?
The traditional but sparse authority of the decided cases may be summarized
as follows. Increased costs will excuse a seller from performance only when the
86 WHITE, supra note 67, at 16, 18-19.
87 363 F.2d at 318.
88 See Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc.2d 1080, 1084, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784,
789 '(Sup. Ct. 1974), where the court held that a 23 percent increase in the price of milk
over a six-month period was foreseeable.
89 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUSiNESS STATISTICS 3 (Sept. 27, 1974).
90 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 1.
91 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
92 Id. at 54, 153 P.2d at 50.
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increases are "extreme," "excessive," "unreasonable," and probably more than
double. In addition, the increases, no matter how extreme, must have been
"unforeseen" and "not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting." Finally, the seller must not have expressly or impliedly assumed a
"greater obligation" to bear such unforeseen, extreme cost increases."
Section 2-615, however, provides roon for a broader, more liberal interpre-
tation than that suggested by the few cases which have considered it. The statute
itself uses only the broad and elastic terms "impracticable" and "basic assump-
tion" rather than the more strict terms "extreme and unreasonable" and "un-
foreseeable." These later standards have their origins in pre-Code law which
followed the older and more restrictive doctrines of impossibility and commercial
frustration.94
This more restrictive, traditional interpretation may circumvent the purpose
of § 2-615: to substitute "commercial standards," "equitable principles," and
"good faith" '95 for a legalistic construction of contracts. Particularly in the case
of long-term contracts, where the parties may have been dealing with each other
for years or even for generations, it may be expected that reasonable businessmen
will be willing to spread the risks and the losses which result from unstable eco-
nomic conditions. It may be expected that sellers routinely will "pass on" at
least part of their increases in cost and it may be regarded as a breach of good
faith to respond to this practice with a lawsuit to enforce the terms of a contract
made several years back.
The average businessman may think that he has a legal right to have con-
tracts enforced to the letter, regardless of how difficult performance becomes.
The same businessman, however, routinely may "waive" this "legal right" on
the theory that "these are rough times and I may need help myself some day."
Where the willingness to accept contract-breaking price increases becomes com-
mon practice, businessmen may continue to think that they are simply waiving
their legal rights as a matter of helpfulness and good will; courts, however, ought
to pay less attention to the businessman's opinion of what the law is and more
attention to the commercial practice which he actually follows.9"
The Code Comment suggests one manner by which additional flexibility
might be achieved without departing from the traditional standards applicable
to excuse:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer
when the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment
under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sec-
tions on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all
the provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general policy of the
93 In addition, the party seeking excuse has the burden of proof on the issues of practi-
cability and foreseeability. See, e.g., Ocean Air Tradeways, Inc. v. Arkay Realty Corp., 480
F.2d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1973).
94 See Annot., 84- A.L.R.2d 12 (1962).
95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6.
96 See UNIFORM COMMERCItL CODE § 1-102(2):
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
'(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial trans-
actions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
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Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and
good faith. 97
In other words, there may be many situations which are not quite so extreme as
to constitute grounds for excuse but where commercial standards and good faith
require price adjustment. The seller would not be excused from performance
or given an opportunity to abandon his obligations toward the buyer in favor
of someone else.9" So also, he would not be given the opportunity to flout com-
mercial expectations by "passing on" any sort of price miscalculation which he
may have made. But where other commercial men in similar circumstances
actually are making price adjustments, he would have the right in good faith to
make the same type of adjustments.99
This right to make price adjustment would have greatest applicability in
situations where costs have increased 50, 100, or 200 percent, where the increases
may have been foreseeable to some debatable extent, and where the seller may
have assumed a "greater obligation" of risk to some extent. In this rather large
grey area in which it is simply unclear whether traditional precedent supports a
claim for excuse, the seller ought to be able to follow the practice of other com-
mercial men who are in similar situations. If he can show that others are re-
negotiating price or accepting contract-breaking price increases, then the court,
in this wide area of uncertainty, ought to accept the prevailing commercial
practice as determinative.0 0
Although this price adjustment approach has not been followed by any of
the reported cases to date, this may be explained by the fact that widespread
sharp inflationary cost increases are unprecedented phenomena of the past year.
One might argue that this approach would greatly weaken that basic principle
of contract law that the promisor assumes the risks of his promise, and that an
easier opportunity for price adjustment would increase litigation and undermine
the fundamental expectation that contracts will be honored according to their
terms. By requiring that any claim for price adjustment be based upon the actual
prevailing commercial standards of the marketplace, however, this approach
would not run counter to commercial standards but rather implement them in in-
dividual cases where a purchaser is intent upon making his good deal "stick."
The obligation to accept price adjustment in good faith, therefore, should not be
seen as a new doctrine in place of excuse but rather as a means for injecting
greater flexibility into the traditional approach and bringing it into greater con-
formity with commercial standards.
Jahn B. Haley
97 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6.
98 See City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal.2d 710, 721, 290 P.2d 841, 847
(1955); compare with Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 320
(D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court stated, "When performance of a contract is deemed im-
possible it is a nullity."
99 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203 provides, "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Between mer-
chants this requires the observance of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade." Id., Comment.
100 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305, which authorizes courts to enforce contracts
even where nothing is said as to price or where the parties fail to agree on price. In such
cases, "the price is a reasonable price at the time of delivery" as determined in "good faith." Id.
[December 1974)
